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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBIN L. HOUGH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
and Cross-Appellant,
Supreme Court
No. 860025

vs.
JOEL E. COLLEY,
Defendant and Appellant
and Cross-Respondent.

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The additional issue presented for review by Respondent's Cross-Appeal is:

Did plaintiff fail to meet her burden of

proof and are the findings of the trial court, that no common law
marriage existed between the parties, adequately supported by
competent evidence in the record.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This Brief is submitted in reply to the answering brief
of Miss Hough and in answer to the issue of a common-law marriage
raised by Miss Hough in her Cross-Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Miss Hough and Dr. Colley met in August, 1972 while they
were both students at the University of Texas in Galveston.

Miss

Hough was looking for a roommate to share expenses in a house she
wanted to rent and asked Dr. Colley if he would be interested; he
responded that he would and they moved into the house together.
The initial arrangement was that the parties would share
expenses.

T. Vol. I, p. 5-6, R. 1169-1170.

Each of the parties continued to lead their own separate
lives and to date other people.
R. 1171, 1471.

T. Vol. I, p. 7, Vol. II, p. 81,

Soon, however, the relationship developed into

one that was "very heated," T. Vol. I, p. 8, R. 1172, and the
parties commenced having sexual relations with each other.
Vol. I, p. 7, 73-74, R. 1171, 1237-1238.

T.

In the spring of 1973,

Miss Hough was visited, in Galveston, by her brother, Steven and
her sister, Maureen, who were both aware that the plaintiff and
the defendant were unmarried but living together.

T. Vol. II, p.

38, R. 1428; S. Hough Depo. p. 6.
In "February or March," according to Miss Hough, the
parties met with Dr. Robert Creason, a professor of psychology at
the University of Texas in Galveston.

Plaintiff claimed that the

Creason meeting occurred because she and Dr. Colley wanted to
talk about "redefining their relationship."
R. 1241-1242.

T. Vol. I, p. 77-78,

Dr* Colley testified, however, that the meeting
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was to discuss the fact that the parties were living together but
were not married.

T. Vol. II, p. 86-87, R. 1476-1477.

In any

event, in April, 1973 Miss Hough took Dr. Colley home to visit
her parents in Fort Worth, Texas.

Prior to that time, Miss Hough

wrote her parents a letter informing them that she was coming
home with Ma surprise", "Joel Colley - my roommate." Ex. 1,
reproduced infra at Al to A2.

Miss Hough's parents were not

pleased with the relationship between the parties and required
that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley occupy separate bedrooms while in
their home.

T. Vol. II, p. 38-39, 90, R. 1428-1429, 1480; Depo.

S. Hough p. 35.

In the spring of 1973, Dr. Colley completed his

medical training at the University of Texas and began an internship in Philadelphia.

Miss Hough originally went to Indianapolis

but later that year, after she had also graduated, joined Dr.
Colley in Pennsylvania.

While in Texas, Miss Hough continued to

use the name of Robin Hough exclusively.

It appeared on her

social security card, and on her Texas driver's license.

In

addition, she graduated from the University of Texas as "Robin
Hough."

T. Vol. I, p. 79, R. 1243.

While in Philadelphia Dr.

Colley worked at a hospital and Miss Hough obtained employment as
an occupational therapist under the name of Robin Hough and had
both a personal bank account and a joint account with Dr. Colley
as Robin Hough, signed all of the checks as Robin Hough and
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traveled as Robin Hough on the AmTrak.

T. Vol. I, p. 80-84, llly

R. 1244-1248, 1275, Ex. 41-46.
In "June or July" of 1974, the parties moved to Hot
Springs, Montana.

Miss Hough was employed as an occupational

therapist under the name of Robin Hough.

In addition, the

parties had a joint checking account under the name of Robin
Hough and Joel Colley.

Miss Hough also had a separate account

under the name of Robin Hough and she signed checks on both of
those accounts as Robin Hough.

Also while in Montana, Miss Hough

joined the American Occupational Therapy Association using the
name of Robin Hough.
47-52.

T. Vol. I, p. 112-114, R. 1276-1278, Ex.

Dr. Colley was employed as a physician in the community

of Hot Springs.
On December 15, 1974, the parties left Hot Springs and
traveled to Texarkana, Arkansas.

While traveling, they stopped

to see Miss Hough's grandmother in Guymon, Oklahoma.

T. Vol. I,

p. 28, R. 1192. While there, Miss Hough's grandmother "burst
into tears" and asked why Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were living
in sin.

Together they explained to her that even though she may

not understand, that was the way they wanted it at that time.
They then left because they were causing Miss Hough's grandmother
a great deal of hurt and pain.
1499-1500.

T. Vol. II, p. 109-110, R.

While the parties resided in Arkansas, Miss Hough
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maintained a bank account under the name of Robin Hough and,
without exception, continued to use her maiden name.

T. Vol. I.

p. 115, R. 1279.
In May, 1975, Miss Hough applied for a United States
Passport.

Ex. 55, reproduced infra at A3 to A5.

Item E on the

passport application required her to check one of two boxes, "I
was never married" or "I was last married on."
checked the box "I was never married."

Miss Hough

T. Vol. I, p. 119, R.

1283.
In the mid-part of 1975, the parties moved to Denver,
Colorado.

While in Colorado, Miss Hough continued to use the

name of Hough exclusively.

She maintained a bank account under

the name of Robin Hough, had a joint account with Dr. Colley
using the name of Hough, was known in the American Occupational
Therapist Association as Robin Hough, conducted business under
the name of Robin Hough, and charged gasoline and other purchases
as Robin Hough.

T. Vol. I, p. 116-119, R. 1280-1283, Ex. 57-69.

Throughout their relationship, Miss Hough and Dr. Colley
discussed getting married.

T. Vol. II, p. 97, R. 1487.

Although

Miss Hough was originally pressing for the ceremony, R. 794, she
later rebuffed Dr. Colley's request that they marry.

T. Vol. II,

p. 114, R. 1504.
In December, 1975, Dr. Colley moved to Salt Lake City.
Miss Hough joined him in January, 1976.
parties separated.
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On October 30, 1981, the

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Miss Hough failed miserably to meet her burden of proof
and convince the trial court that there had been a common law
marriage.

She failed to prove that there was an agreement bet-

ween the parties that they would marry and further failed to
prove that the reputation of the parties in the communities in
which they lived was that of husband and wife.
Miss Hough is vague concerning when and where she contends she married Dr. Colley and, in fact, alleged, just prior to
trial, that she had married him by common law in four different
states, a most absurd contention.
Miss Hough used her maiden name throughout the relationship, introduced Dr. Colley to her parents as her "roommate", or
referred to him as someone she was "living with."

In addition,

she freely admitted that she was not married to him and swore,
under oath, that she had never been married.

The credible evi-

dence showed, overhwelmingly, that there had not been a marriage
between the parties; thus, the findings of the trial court in
that regard must be upheld.
The court erred, however, in finding that there was a
partnership between the parties.

As with the purported marriage,

Miss Hough failed to state where and when the partnership was
formed and what business it was supposedly conducting.

The fact

that two people co-habitat together does not create a partner-
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ship? howeverf if there was a partnership its obligations must be
repaid before there is a distribution to the parties.

The trial

court's refusal to order the debts repaid and to compensate Dr.
Colley for the funds infused into the properties after Miss Hough
walked out, is clear error.
I
PLAINTIFF1S STATEMENT OF "FACTS" IS GROSSLY
DISTORTED AND MISLEADING TO THE COURT
In her zeal to advocate her position, Miss Hough has
distorted the facts and in the process has grossly misrepresented
to this Court what really happened.

While a review of the record

will reveal plaintiff's biased version of the "facts," defendant
feels compelled to present illustrative, but not exhaustive,
examples of plaintiff's actions.
Plaintiff's first slanted "fact" relates to the meeting
with Dr. Robert Creason.

Resp. Br., p. 4-5.

Miss Hough states

that the parties purportedly told Dr. Creason that they had "a
committed relationship" and a marriage "relationship" that would
continue.
Hough's.

Dr. Colley's testimony was quite different from Miss
He stated that the Creason meeting dealt with the fact

that the parties were not married and that they wished to discuss
the ramifications of their decision to live together without marriage.

T. Vol. II, p. 86-87, R. 1476-1477.

For Miss Hough,

therefore, to state as a "fact" only her version of that meeting
is improper.
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Miss Hough next cites, as a "fact," her version of the
meeting with her parents in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1973.

Miss

Hough cleverly weaves into her story, certain words that are not
found in the record.

For instance, Miss Hough states that her

parents were distressed because the parties had not participated
in a "ceremonial marriage."
testified as follows:

Resp. Br. p. 5.

Actually, plaintiff

"My mom, in particular, had extreme

concern about the statement."

T. Vol. I, p. 12, R. 1176.

There

is absolutely no reference to a "ceremonial marriage" in the
record as cited by plaintiff, although it is true that Miss
Hough's parents were deeply distressed about the relationship of
the parties.

T. Vol. II, p. 39, R. 1429.

Dr. Colley testified

that at the meeting in Fort Worth, Miss Hough explained to her
parents that the parties were living together under the same roof
and having sex and that they did not want to be married.
II, p. 89, R. 1479.

T. Vol.

In response thereto, Miss Hough's parents

refused to allow the parties to occupy the same bedroom while in
their home.

T. Vol. II, p. 90, R. 1480.

Although Dr. Colley specifically denied the various
statements attributed to him by plaintiff, T. Vol. II, p. 80, R.
1479, she now cites them as "facts".
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that the parties combined
furniture and belongings and were shipped to Philadelphia.
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Resp. Br. p. 5.

Dr. Colley denied that.

T. Vol. II, p. 93, 292,

R. 1483, 1679.
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that Dr. Colley gave her
"a set of wedding rings that had belonged to his mother." Resp.
Br. p. 6.

Not only did Dr. Colley deny that he had ever given

any rings to Miss Hough, T. Vol. II, p. 191, R. 1581, Miss Hough,
herself, originally stated that she had not received any wedding
rings.

On August 10, 1983, Miss Hough testified at her

deposition as follows:
Q.

Did Dr. Colley give you a wedding ring?

A.

No, he did not.

Q.

Did you ever ask him for one?

A.

We had talked about a ring and had
decided the fact that I wasnft too wild
about diamonds, I would rather have a
colored stone and at one time Joel had
investigated about buying an emerald and
instead gave me a couple of opals, but I
never had them mounted into a ring. T.
Vol. I, p. 77, R. 1467.

In addition, the photograph introduced by Miss Hough, as
Ex. 2, which photograph is now "mysteriously" missing from the
Clerk's Evidence Room, shows Miss Hough's left hand; she is not
wearing a wedding ring.

For the plaintiff to boldly state,

therefore, that she received a wedding ring from the defendant as
a "fact" of this case is clearly contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.
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Miss Hough states as a "fact" that there was a discussion with the accountant in Philadelphia wherein Dr. Colley
stated that they were "common law married."

Resp. Br, p. 7.

Dr.

Colley denied any such discussion but testified, rather, that the
parties, knowing that they were not married, decided to file a
joint return because they did not want to give the government any
more money than was absolutely necessary.

T. Vol. II, p.

100-101, R. 1490-1491.
Miss Hough states several times in her brief that the
parties filed joint returns "representing under penalty of perjury" that they were married.

That is totally false.

Plaintiff

did not produce any of the income tax returns of the parties
during the years in question.

The issue of the contents of the

returns and whether they were signed under penalty of perjury was
specifically presented to the trial court and the trial court
ruled that there was no evidence that any such statement appeared
on the returns.

T. Vol. II, p. 294-295, R. 1681-1682.

Thus, the

precise "fact" now being asserted by Miss Hough is not only
unsupported by the evidence, it was specifically rejected by the
trial court.

In addition, Dr. Colley testified repeatedly that

the joint returns were filed because the parties felt entitled to
the extra deductions because they were living together and, since
there was no provision for people who were co-habitating to file
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jointly, in order to file a joint return, the joint return box
had to be checked.

T. Vol. II, p. 100-101, R. 1489-1490.

Miss Hough states as a "fact" that while in Montana, Dr.
Colley stated to her brother, Steven, that they had a common law
marriage and therefore could file a joint tax return with no
problems.
statement.

Resp. Br. p. 7.

Dr. Colley denied ever making such a

Such a recitation of "fact" ignores plaintiff's own

testimony and the testimony of her brother, Steven.
any such statement was made to him in Montana.

He denied

He testified that

the first time that he learned that the parties were filing a
joint return was in Arkansas, Depo. S. Hough, p. 11, 62, long
after the parties had left Montana.

In addition, plaintiff, her-

self, testified that the tax return for 1974 was filed around
April 15, 1975, T. Vol. I, p. 153, R. 1317, approximately four
(4) months after the parties had moved from Montana.

Miss

Hough's brother testified that he was only in Montana during
August and September, 1974, therefore, it is highly unlikely that
there would have been any discussion about filing a joint tax
return in Montana, some seven (7) months before it was due.
Ignoring all of that, however, and in spite of the overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, plaintiff recites the purported
conversation as "fact".
Miss Hough's statement that Dr. Colley introduced her at
a reception in Montana as his wife, ignores not only the
testimony of Dr. Colley, T. Vol. II, p. 103, R. 1493, but also
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that of two Hot Springs residents who testified to the contrary.
Depos. Roosma and Heinselman.

Apparently undeterred by the

voluminous evidence refuting her contention, plaintiff persists
in presenting her biased version of what transpired as a "fact."
Miss Hough states that since Dr. Colley wanted to move,
the parties left Montana and lived in Texas "again."
p. 8.

Resp. Br.

In actual fact, according to plaintiff's own testimony,

the move was necessitated by the closure of the hospital in
Montana.

T. Vol. I, p. 28, R. 1192. More important, however, is

the fact that the parties did not live in Texas but lived in
Arkansas, a fact that was acknowledged by Miss Hough's own
counsel.

T. Vol. I, p. 29, R. 1193.
Since Texas is a common law state, but Arkansas is not,

the distinction between living in Texas or living in Arkansas is
significant, and Miss Hough's attempt to mislead this Court into
believing that the parties "lived in Texas again" can only be
characterized as a feeble try to bolster her claim of a common
law marriage.
Plaintiff states that "after only a few months" Dr.
Colley became disenchanted with the residency program in
Colorado.

Resp. Br. p. 8.

Actually, the plaintiff, herself,

testified that the residency training program "kind of fell apart
while we were there."

T. Vol. I, p. 39, R. 1203.

Rather than

being disenchanted, Dr. Colley testified that the Head of the
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Department was leaving and taking everybody with him and that Dr.
Colley did not want to go to Ann Arbor.

T. Vol. II, p. 114, R.

1504.
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that she evaluated and
located "numerous properties" that the parties purchased.
Br. p. 9.

Resp.

In actual fact, the plaintiff testified that some of

the properties in Utah were located by other real estate agents
and some were located by her.

All properties outside Utah were

located by others. T. Vol. I, p. 52 f R. 1216.

Miss Hough further

acknowledged that she was not sure exactly what properties she
had located.

T. Vol. I, p. 68, R. 1232.

Plaintiff states that Dr. Colley's pension plan had a
net asset value of approximately $100,000, at the time of separation and that the value of the pension plan "prior to trial" had
risen to approximately $300,000.

Resp. Br. p. 11.

At the time

of separation, the retirement trust showed a total asset value of
$184,000.

Ex. 29.

One hundred four thousand dollars of that

amount related to the loans to the parties that the trial court
has refused to have repaid.

In addition, $33,500 was for the

contribution for 1981 to be made in the future by Dr. Colley,
$20,000 related to land in Park City which the court subsequently
ordered sold and $10,000 consisted of land in Montana which ultimately became valueless.

The maximum value at separation, there-
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fore, was no more than $17,000.

The "$300,000" figure for 1983

is similarly misleading since it also contains the loans, the
contribution receivable from Dr. Colley, the Montana land and
$80,000 for the Park City property.

In addition, by 1984, the

value of the gross trust assets had declined $125,000.
II. p. 25-28, 32-33, R. 1415-1418, 1422-1423.

T. Vol,

Thus, plaintiff

attempts to leave this Court with the false impression that the
retirement trust constitutes an enormous fund of wealth, when in
reality it has little, if any, value at the present time and any
future value is dependent upon repayment of the loans, which
plaintiff has vigorously resisted doing.
Plaintiff states that the parties "frequently" celebrated their anniversary on August 24th, the date that they first
met.

Resp. Br, p. 13.

In actual fact, plaintiff, testified

that, rather than celebrating that date frequently, it was not
celebrated consistently throughout their relationship.

She

stated, "We would celebrate it one year and the next we would
forget, and then celebrate it and then forget."

T. Vol. I, p.

110, R. 1274.
Miss Hough states as a "fact" that Dr. Colley "admitted"
that he had received $100,000 in tax benefits since the parties
separated.

Dr. Colley^ testimony was hardy the admission

claimed by plaintiff.

He actually testified as follows:

Q. (By Mr. Dart) You've had the benefits of
$100,000 in write-offs on these investments since
your separation from Robin on money you earned in
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1982, that you didn't share with Robin?
A, I don't - - I'll have to think about that.
Doesn't show capital expenditures, it also doesn't
show future tax obligations; so that is a very
misleading way to present this. T. Vol. II, p.
277-278, R. 1665-1666.
Perhaps the most egregious misrepresentation to this
Court appears on page 7 of Miss Hough's brief where, apparently
in a deliberate attempt to mislead this Court, she states that
the parties acguired a house in Hot Springs, Montana.

Plaintiff

further produced, at A33 through A40, the documents relating to
that purchase.

Miss Hough failed to point out, however, that the

property in question was purchased in 1976, while the parties
were residing in Utah, almost two years after they had left
Montana.

The purchase, therefore, could have no relevance on the

issue of whether or not the parties held themselves out, while in
Montana, as being married; nevertheless, in support of her contention that there was a common law marriage, Miss Hough
deviously refers the Court, on page 37 of her brief, to the property purchase.

Plaintiff's failure to forthrightly inform this

Court that the property was not actually purchased while the
parties lived in Montana comes dangerously close to constituting
fraud upon this Court.
Miss Hough has carefully selected those items of testimony which support her version of what transpired and has conveniently ignored any testimony or exhibits to the contrary.
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In

an attempt to advocate her cause, plaintiff has grossly mislead
this Court.

Such conduct is most opprobrious.
II

THERE WAS NO COMMON LAW MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Plaintiff cleverly argues that the trial court refused
to recognize the common law marriage between the parties.
Actually the court held that n£ common law marriage occurred.
The court's ruling is correct.
A.

Since the issue of the alleged marriage is factual,

the trial court's findings must be upheld.

The issue of the

existence or non-existence of a common law marriage between the
parties presents a guestion of fact.

The scope of review on

appeal is different, therefore, then for eguitable matters.
Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975).
The plaintiff failed to persuade the court that a common
law marriage had occurred.

The trial court found that it had

not; therefore, that factual determination should not be upset on
appeal unless there is no substantial record evidence to support
it.

Ercanbrack v. Crandall-Walker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 (Utah

1976).

Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985);
B.

Common law marriages are founded upon the mutual

consent of the parties to be married and a public showing of
marriage thereafter.

The main thrust of plaintiff's claim of a

common law marriage was, apparently, centered around the rela-
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tionship of the parties in Galvestonf Texas.

Miss Hough origi-

nally claimed that she married defendant on August 24, 1972, JR^
2^

Realizing that such a claim was absurd since that was the day

the parties first met, she amended her claim to sometime in
"August, 1972."

R. 19.

She abandoned that position at the time

of trial, however, and claimed that she had been married by
common law in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana and Colorado.
835-836.

R.

She has, however, never stated precisely where and when

she contends that the marriage, or marriages, took place.
Although the requirements for a valid common law marriage vary
slightly from state to state, among those states that recognize
common law marriages, all common law states require a clear
meeting of the minds between the parties and a public holding out
and reputation of marriage in the community before a valid common
law marriage can exist.

Mere isolated instances in which one

party may represent that he or she is married are insufficient.
In addition, co-habitation alone does not create a common law
marriage.

The key element is consent, deliberately given with

the intention that a marriage result therefrom.

Absent such

consent there can be no common law marriage; therefore, Miss
Hough's failure to pinpoint the date, time and place of marriage
clearly shows that there was no marriage consent and, hence, no
marriage.

What woman, other than Miss Hough, does not know
precisely when and where she was married?
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1.
law marriage.
(1949).

Utah Law.

Utah does not recognize a common

Johnson v. Johnson, 116 Utah 27 f 207 P.2d 1036

A common law marriage can not be consummated in Utahf it

must be solemnized as required by statute.
110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183 (1946).

In re Vetas' Estate,

The Vetas case implies,

however, that Utah will recognize a common law marriage by
residents of other states which is valid in the other state.
Such, however, was not the case here.
2.

Texas Law.

Three elements are necessary in

order to create a common law marriage in the state of Texas:
(a)

The parties must agree to be
married, and

(b)

After the agreement, they must live
together in the state of Texas as
husband and wife, and

(c)

They must hold themselves out to the
public as husband and wife.

Section 1.91 Vernon's Texas Code Annotated; Walter v.
Walter, 433 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
In order to have a common law marriage in Texas there
must be a mutual agreement of marriage between the parties.
Gary v. Gary, 490 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) the Court
said, in discussing the elements of a common law marriage:
It is particularly essential that the
parties mutually agree that they would
then and thenceforth be husband and wife
and that the following co-habitation be
on the faith of this agreement and
promise.
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In

The agreement to become husband and wife must be an
agreement to do so presently and not in the future.

Id.

Co-habitation alone does not create a common law marriage.
must also be a specific agreement to be married.

There

Present consent

and agreement to be married is the jist of a common law marriage
and it is not sufficient to agree on present co-habitation and
future marriage.

The Gary Court went on to state:

We have found no case nor have we been
directed to any which allowed the inference of an agreement to be made solely on
the basis of proven co-habitation. . .
Agreement is fundamental and co-habitation is only one element of a common law
marriage which will not suffice in itself. The agreement necessary for a
common law marriage must be specific from
both sides. . .
There must be a meeting of the minds or
there is no contract (referring to a
marriage contract). Id.
In Texasf the trier of fact must specifically find that
an agreement to be husband and wife existed in that state, that
the parties intended that their agreement create a marriage and
that it was to be an immediate and permanent relationship.

In re

Estate of Bivians, 652 P.2d 744 (N.M. App. 1982) (applying Texas
law).

In the instant case, the trial court specifically found

that there was no such agreement; therefore, there could be no
marriage.
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In order to establish a valid common law marriage in
Texas, the parties must publicly hold themselves out as husband
and wife.

Secrecyf it has been held, is inconsistent and

irreconcilable with the requirement of a public holding out that
the couple is living together as husband and wife.
Threet, 333 S.W.2d 361 (Texas 1960).

Ex parte

In Walter v. Walter, supray

the Court stated:
The public and open holding out that the
two are man and wife are as essential to
a valid common law marriage as the agreement itself, without these elements there
is no common law marriage.
Under Texas law there must be an uncontroverted reputation in the community in which the parties live in order to
establish a common law marriage.

As the Court stated in Walter

v. Walter, supra:
Repute must be general extending to the
friends and relatives of both parties
with whom their daily lives are spent,
and such repute must not be divided,
(emphasis added).
Under ordinary circumstances, the agreement, which is
the essential element of a common law marriage, may be implied if
it is proved that the parties lived together as husband and wife
and held themselves out to the public as husband and wife.
v. Gary, supra.

Gary

Where, however, the initial relationship between

the parties is illicit in its origin, as it was here, the law
raises from it no presumption of marriage.

-20-

Walter v. Walter,

supra*

Under Texas law where the original relationship between

the parties is illicit, there is an inference that that relationship continues.

In re Estate of Biviansy supra.

As the Bivians

Court observed,

"The law presumes that a status, relation or

intent proved to exist continues as along as usual with things of
that nature.

This applies to illicit relationships."

Further,

the court stated, "For an illicit relationship to become transmitted into a valid common law marriage, the evidence must show
actual matrimony by unilateral consent of each of the parties
within the state authorizing common law marriages." Id.
Under Texas law, claims of a common law marriage are
closely scrutinized by the Courts.

Strict requirements

necessitating proof of each of the elements of such a marriage
must be established before the Courts will lend judicial sanction
to any assertions that a marriage relationship exists.
Estate of Bivians, supra; Gary v. Gary, supra.

In re

The evidence

presented by plaintiff in this case must, therefore, exclude the
inference that the original illicit relationship between herself
and the defendant continued and it must show the formulation in
Texas of a new matrimonial intent by each of the parties.
Estate of Bivians, supra.
3.

In re

It did not.

Pennsylvania Law.

As in Texas, the basis of a

common law marriage in Pennsylvania is an agreement between the
parties to presently become husband and wife followed by co-
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habitation and a general reputation in the community of being
married.

Seef In re Lattanzi Appeal, 35 Beaver 187 (Pa. Ct. Com.

Pleas 1976).

Pennsylvania law requires that there must be an

agreement entered into in that state by uttering words in the
present tense with an intent to establish a marital relationship.
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 398 A.2d 978 (Pa. 1979); In re Lattanzi
Appeal, supra.

A present intent to enter into a common law

marriage is the critical element in proving such a marriage.
Bowden v. Workman's Comp. App. Bd., 376 A.2d 1033 (Pa. Cmwlth.,
1977); The Estate of Gavula, 417 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1980).

The

statement of the Court in Hertz v. Hertz, 23 D&C 3d 55 (Pa. Ct.
Comm. Pleas 1981) is particularly applicable in this case.
Since people live together without intending to marryf there must be proof of
an agreement to enter into the relationship in order to establish that the
parties are married.
Under the law of Pennsylvania, a presumption of marriage
based upon co-habitation and reputation will not arise where the
parties lived together unmarried up to the time of the alleged
agreement to create a common law relationship.
Estate, 479 A.2d 537 (Pa. Super. 1984).

In re Cummings1

Where a relationship

between a man and a woman is illicit and meretricious in its
inception, it is presumed to so continue during the co-habitation
of the parties.

In re Oravetz Estate, 55 Erie 94 (Pa. Ct. Com.

Pleas 1972).
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In order to prove a common law marriage in Pennsylvania,
reputation of marriage is reguired, i.e.,

the parties must be

regarded as married by their friends and neighbors*

In re

Craddock's Case, 37 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. 1941) (applying Pennsylvania law).

In In re Stevens' Estate, 116 A. 162 (Pa. 1922), the

Court observed that the conduct of the parties must be such that
almost anyone acguainted with them would naturally infer that
they were married to each other.

In that case the defendant pro-

vided plaintiff with a home approximately five miles away from
where he lived.

The parties were known as husband and wife in

the area of the home, but defendant was known as single in the
area where he resided.

The Court concluded that plaintiff had

failed to establish that the reputation of the parties was that
of being married among their friends and associates.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Pa. 132 (1866),
the Court there stated that reputation must be proved by the
neighbors and acguaintances and that reputation consists of
"speech of the people who have the opportunity to know the parties."

Of more recent vintage is the case of Van Brakle v.

Lanauze, 438 A.2d 992 (Pa. Super. 1981), where the Court noted
that the reputation (for marriage) must be broad and general.
the case of In re Manfredi's Estate, 399 Pa. 285, 159 A.2d 697
(1960), the Court observed that the mere fact that the parties
were known to a few people as man and wife is not sufficient to
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In

establish a common law marriage.

The Court stated that a

reputation for such purpose must be general and not confined to a
few persons in the immediate neighborhood, since the relationship
may be established merely for the purpose of deceiving others.
Admissions to a few individuals that a person is one's
"wife" or "husband" are insufficient to prove a common law marriage in Pennsylvania.
of Gavula, supra.

Levy's Estate, 161 A. 740 (1932); Estate

In factf even if there is a general holding

out as husband and wife there is no common law marriage absent a
present intention to be married.

Bowden v. Workman's Comp. App.

Bd., supra.
In Melon v. Richardson, 466 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972) the
Court refused to find a valid Pennsylvania common law marriage
even though the couple lived together for seven (7) yearsf had
operated a business jointly, had filed joint tax returns and had
owned property jointly.

The Court found that there were no

"words in the present tense uttered with a view and for the
purpose of establishing the relation of husband and wife;"
therefore, there was no common law marriage.
4.

Montana Law.

In Montana the requirements of a

common law marriage are established by statute.

Section 48-101,

R. C. M. (1974) provides:
Marriage is a personal relation arising
out of a civil contract, to which the
consent of parties capable of making it
is necessary. Consent alone will not
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constitute marriage; it must be followed
by a solemnization of the marital relation, or by mutual and public assumption
of the marital relation.
In Montana, therefore, a common law marriage requires
not only the consent of both parties but, in addition, there must
be a mutual and public assumption of the marital relation.

In

Miller v. Townsend Lumber Company, 448 P.2d 148 (Mont. 1968), the
Court stated that the requirements for a valid common law
marriage in Montana are:
1.

A mutual consent of the parties;

2.

Assumption of the marriage relationship as of a time certain;

3.

Co-habitation; and

4.

Repute.

Regarding repute, the Miller Court stated:
"When we speak of repute we mean reputation, being the character
and status commonly ascribed to one's actions by the public."
Absent a public assumption of the marriage relation there can be
no common law marriage in Montana.

State v. Newman, 213 P.805

(Mont. 1923).
In order to establish a common law marriage in Montana
there must be a specific agreement and it must take place immediately, it can not be created piecemeal, it either comes instantly
into being or it does not come at all.
Peltomaa, 630 P.2d 215 (Mont. 1981).
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Matter of the Estate of

Co-habitation alone is insufficient to create a common
law marriage.

In re Estate of Slavens, 509 P.2d 293 (Mont.

1973)? Miller v. Townsend Lumber Co., supra; In re Miller v.
Houston's Estate, 139 P. 458 (Mont. 1914)*

In the case of Miller

v. Sutherland, 309 P.2d 322 (Mont. 1957), the Court described the
consent that is required under Montana law to create a common law
marriage.

There the Court stated:
Consent. . . must always be given with
such an intent on the part of each of the
parties that marriage can not be said to
steal upon them unawares. One can not
become married unwittingly or accidentally. The consent required by our
statutes, as well as the statutes of
every state, and by the common law, must
be seriously given with the deliberate
intention that marriage result presently
therefrom. There must be an agreement
between the parties that they will hold
towards each other the relation of husband and wife, with all the responsibilities and duties which the law attaches to
such relation, otherwise there can be no
lawful marriage. . . The absence of such
consent renders the relations of the
parties meretricious.
In Miller v. Sutherland, supra, the Court defined the

meaning of a mutual and public assumption of the marital relation, as a "course of conduct on the part of both man and wife
towards each other and toward the world as that people generally
would take them to be married."
As in Pennsylvania and Texas, the law of Montana presumes that an illicit relationship continues, and, therefore,
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there is no presumption of a common law marriage where the
initial relationship of the parties is meretricious.

See Stevens

v. Woodman of the World, 71 P.2d 898 (Mont. 1937).
In Montana, as in all other states, mere isolated
instances in which one represents his or herself as married are
insufficient to establish a common law marriage in the absence of
a specific agreement to be married.

In re Estate of Peltomaa,

supra.
5.
in Arkansas.

Arkansas Law.

There is no common law marriage

Spicer v. Spicer, 397 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1965).
6.

Colorado Law.

An agreement to marry entered

into in Colorado is fundamental to the creation of a common law
marriage.

Graham v. Graham, 274 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1954).

A common

law marriage in Colorado must be established by proof of consent,
co-habitation and reputation.

Graham v. Graham, supra.

In cases

where the contract or agreement is denied and can not be shown,
its existence may be proven by, and presumed from, evidence of
co-habitation as husband and wife and general repute.

Id.

General repute means the understanding among the neighbors and
acquaintances with whom the parties associate in their daily life
that they are living together as husband and wife and not in
meretricious intercourse.
(Colo. Ct. App. 1897).

Id^. , Taylor v. Taylor, 50 P. 1049

In its application to the issue of

marriage, repute is more than mere hearsay.
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It involves and is

made up of social conduct and recognition giving character to an
admitted and unconcealed co-habitation.

Taylor v. Taylor, supra.

It is necessary that there be evidence of both co-habitation and
reputation before a marriage can be presumed.

Graham v. Graham,

supra.

Proof of one alone is not sufficient.

Taylor v. Taylor,

supra.

Where an initial relationship begins as meretricious, the

party must show by competent evidence that the relationship has
changed.

Pickett v. Pickett, 161 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1945).
C.

An Isolated reference to someone as a spouse does

not create a marriage.

The case law is clear that mere isolated

references to one or the other party as a spouse do not constitute the required holding out to the community and are, therefore, insufficient to establish a common law marriage. *Gary v.
Gary, supra; Ex parte Threet, supra.

As the Bivians Court

declared:
An occasional holding out of marriage or
mere sexual relationship in a state
authorizing common law marriage does not
result in a formulation of a bona fide
marriage.
In Mellon v. Richardson, supra, the Court held that
filing joint tax returns and owning property jointly did not
constitute a common law marriage.

Similarly, the Courts in

Estate of Peltomaa, supra, and In re Estate of Bivians, supra,
found that there was no common law marriage even though the
parties had filed joint tax returns.
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Maintaining joint bank

accounts is also insufficient to create a common law marriage.
In re Estate of Biviansy supra.
In In the Matter of the Estate of McClellan, 541 P.2d
780 (Mont. 1975), the Court observed that holding oneself out as
married only when it is of benefit is not sufficient to establish
a common law marriage.

In additionf merely registering at a

hotel as a married couple does not create a common law marriage.
Miller v. Sutherland/ supra.

In Claveria v. Estate of Claveria,

597 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), rev'd other grounds, 615
S.W.2d 164, the execution of a mortgage loan transaction where
both parties acknowledged themselves to be husband and wife, was
held to be legally insufficient to establish a common law
marriage in Texas.

The law requires a consistent, broad, general

reputation of marriage.
Brakle v. Lanauze, supra.

In re Estate of Bivians, supra; Van
Absent that, there can not be a common

law marriage.
D.
riage.

There is a public policy against common law mar-

Common law marriages are disfavored by the Courts.

As

the Court in Van Brakle v. Lanauze, supra, observed, "common law
marriage is a fruitful source of perjury and fraud to be
tolerated and not encouraged."

More recently the Court, in In re

Estate of Bivians, supra, stated that "the time of liberal
construction of common law marriages is past" since it "opens the
door to false pretenses of marriage."

-29-

E.

Miss Hough must prove the existence of the alleged

common law marriage. Contrary to the erroneous assertion in her
2
brief, Miss Hough has the burden of proving the existence of the
alleged common law marriage.

The law in Texas reguires the

plaintiff to "clearly show" the common law marriage.
Gary, supra.

Gary v.

In Pennsylvania, proof of the marriage must be made

by clear and convincing evidence.
A.2d 307 (Pa. 1977),
Ct. Comm. Pleas 1975)*

In re Estate of Garges, 378

In re Estate of Ross, 38 Fay.L.J. 32 (Pa.
In Colorado the standard of proof is

"clear, consistent, convincing and positive".
Bivians, supra.

In re Estate of

Under Montana law the plaintiff must prove her

case by a preponderance of the evidence, Miller v. Sutherland,
supra, but Montana law reguires proof not only of the agreement,
but also proof of the public assumption of the marital relation
after the agreement.
In the instant case, Miss Hough not only has the burden
of proving the existence of the common law marriage but, in
addition thereto, since the initial relationship of the parties
was illicit, 3 she must also rebut, by clear and convincing evi-

Miss Hough incorrectly states, at p.3 of her brief,
that in Colorado the party opposing the marriage must show
by positive proof that the marriage is invalid. Taylor v.
Taylor, the case cited by Miss Hough is reproduced infra at
A6 to A7. Dr. Colley will leave it to the reader to determine whether that case stands for what Miss Hough claims.
Plaintiff freely admitted that the parties were having
sexual relations together prior to any purported marriage.
T. Vol. I, p. 7, 73-74, R. 1171, 1237-1238.
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dence, the presumption that the illicit relationship continued
during the co-habitation of the parties.

See, e.g., Walter v.

Walter, supra; In re Estate of Bivians, supra; In re Cummings'
Estate, supra; Stevens v. Woodman of the World, supra; Pickett v.
Pickett, supra.

Thus, Miss Hough must not only carry her normal

burden of proof, she must also overcome the presumption that,
based upon the illicit nature of the relationship between the
parties, no common law marriage occurred.

Defendant submits that

plaintiff wholly failed to do either.
F.

The evidence adduced by plaintiff was clearly insuf-

ficient to show that a common law marriage had occurred.

Plain

tiff failed to produce any credible evidence relating to her
contention that "somewhere" a common law marriage had occurred
between the parties.
1.

Plaintiff's evidence regarding an agreement to

be married in Texas can not be believed.

On December 15, 1983,

Miss Hough, in response to Defendant's Interrogatory to "List by
name, address and telephone number each and every person known to
plaintiff to have knowledge of any discoverable matter that is
relevant to the issues set forth in plaintiff's complaint" named
some fifty-eight (58) people scattered throughout the world.
Significantly missing was any reference to Dr. Robert Creason.

Plaintiff named people throughout the United States
as well as Mexico and Australia.
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R. 137-144.

At her deposition on May 16f 1984, plaintiff was

asked to give the names of anyone in the state of Texas that she
and defendant represented themselves to as being married during
1972 or 1973.

Plaintiff responded that she could name no one.

T. Vol. I, p. 200f R. 1364.

On January 24, 1985, in opposition

to Dr. Colley's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue
of a common law marriage, Miss Hough filed an affidavit wherein
she mentioned Dr. Creason for the first time.

Significantlyf

Miss Hough did not contend that there had been a marriagef
rather, she stated that the parties had "entered into a lifetime
commitment to one another, which commitment and relationship
contained all the characteristics and elements of a marriage."
R. 793.

(emphasis added).

At the time of trial, however,

plaintiff again modified her testimony andf apparently in an
attempt to salvage her claim of marriage, testified that the
parties told Dr. Creason that they were going to make a
"committed relationship" and form a "marriage relationship."
Vol. I, p. 9-10y R. 1174-1175.

T.

Plaintiff's choice of words,

however, would not, even if believed, be sufficient to create a
marriage since they did not express a present intent to then and
there be married to each other as man and wife.
Gary, supra; In re Estate of Bivians, supra.

See Gary v*

Defendant denied

that such statements were made and testified that the meeting
with Dr. Creason was to discuss the ramifications of the parties
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living together in a non-marital relationship.

T. Vol. II, p.

86, R. 1476.
In addition to the fact that plaintiff "forgot" about
the meeting with Dr. Creason when she filed her complaint, answered Defendant's Interrogatories and had her deposition taken
and, in fact, forgot about the meeting until right before trial,
the letter written by plaintiff to her parents to explain her
relationship with defendant conclusively established that there
was no common law marriage.

In that letter, Ex. 1, Miss Hough

referred to the defendant as "her roommate," not as her husband.
The meeting with Dr. Creason, according to plaintiff, occurred in
"February or March" of 1973.

T. Vol. I, p. 77-78, R. 1241-1242.

Plaintiff's meeting with her parents, and her letter to them,
occurred in the later part of April, 1973, at least one month
after the Creason meeting.

Had plaintiff and defendant truly

entered into a common law marriage, Miss Hough surely would have
introduced Dr. Colley to her parents as her husband, not as her
roommate.

In addition, had a marriage actually occurred, Miss

Hough undoubtedly would have known the exact date of the meeting
rather than an approximation of "February or March."
Plaintiff places great reliance upon her disputed version of the meeting in Fort Worth with her parents.

Her version,

however, is totally inconsistent with her letter designating Dr.
Colley as her roommate, her subsequent actions, and particularly
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her affidavit wherein she stated that on April 21, 1973, she told
her parents that she and Dr. Colley were "planning to live
together."

R. 793-794.

(emphasis added).

Miss Hough attempts to bolster her story through the
testimony of her sister, Maureen, hardly an impartial witness.
Maureen testified that both she and her brother, Steven, were
present when Miss Hough first introduced her roommate, Dr.
Colley, to her parents.

T. Vol. II, p. 43, R. 1433.

however, said that he was not there.

Depo. S. Hough p. 7.

Hough could not remember who was there.
1175.

Steven,
Miss

T. Vol. I. p. 11, R.

Dr. Colley testified that neither Steven nor Maureen were

present.

T. Vol. II, p. 84, R. 1474.
Maureen testified that during that meeting, Dr. Colley

stated that he and Miss Hough were married "in every sense of the
word," and that he felt committed to Miss Hough "as he would a
wife," and that he "considered" her his wife.

Although plaintiff

characterizes these statements as an "eloguent articulation" the
very phrases used by Ms. Rosamond to characterize the discussion
that purportedly took place, if she was actually present, clearly
show that there had been no marriage.
Except for the alleged conversation, Ms. Rosamond could
remember none of the specifics of what happened.

She had no idea

how Miss Hough introduced Dr. Colley to her parents and had no
recollection whether or not she was actually present when Miss
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Hough and Dr. Colley first arrived.

T. Vol. II, p. 40y R. 1430.

She did confirm, however, that her parents were upset with the
relationship and that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were not allowed
to sleep in the same bedroom while in the home of Miss Hough's
parents, T. Vol. II, p. 39, R. 1429, a most curious restriction
if, as plaintiff contends, the parties were married.
Dr. Colley submits that it is highly unlikely that
either of Miss Hough1s siblings were present when she introduced
her "roommate" to her parents for the first time, an event which
plaintiff characterized as being "uncomfortable."

T. Vol. I, p.

110, R. 1274.
In her zeal to support her sister's cause, Ms. Rosamond
stumbled quite badly. She substantially embellished the contents
of plaintiff's "roommate" letter and testified that it contained
references to both a marriage and to travel to Philadelphia.
Vol. II, p. 40, R. 1430.

It contained neither.

T.

The obviously

erroneous testimony of Ms. Rosamond, coupled with her lack of
detail and her relationship to Miss Hough, properly justified the
trial court's refusal to place much, if any, credence in her
statements.
Miss Hough received no support from her brother.

He

testified that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were "living together as
lovers" in Galveston and that on April 20, 1973, they went to
Fort Worth to announce "their relationship" to her parents.
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Depo. S. Hough, p. 6,

Mr. Ronald Radcliffe testifiedf without

contradiction, that he had had conversations with both Steven and
Maureen subseguent to the alleged Fort Worth meeting and that
they both admitted to him that Miss Hough and Dr. Colley were not
married.

T. Vol. II. p. 239-249, R. 1627-1637.
Miss Hough testified that the parties celebrated the

24th of August as their anniversary.

She stated, "we used the

day that we met as an anniversary date."
1274.

T. Vol. I, p. 110, R.

Miss Hough further acknowledged that the anniversary was

not celebrated consistently.

In any event it is most curious

that the parties would celebrate, even on an occasional basis,
the day that they met as their anniversary if, in fact, the
parties had actually entered into a subseguent marriage.
The fact that plaintiff, herself, could not even
remember the date of the meeting with Dr. Creason and the fact
that the parties never celebrated that unknown date as their
wedding anniversary coupled with Miss Hough's characterization of
the defendant as her "roommate" after the date of the purported
meeting clearly shows that plaintiff's version of the Creason
meeting was a recent fabrication and that her claim of marriage
was not believed by the trial court.
2.

There was no general reputation of marriage

between plaintiff and defendant in Texas.

At the trial plaintiff

could identify only five (5) people to whom she contended that
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she had represented that the parties were married.

Those indi-

viduals apparently included Dr. Creason, her brother, her sister
and her parents.

With the exception of the disputed statements

to Dr. Creason, all other statements occurred in Fort Worth,
Texas, approximately 300 miles from Galveston, the community in
which the plaintiff and the defendant resided.
38, R. 1428.

T. Vol. II, p.

Significantly missing from plaintiff's witnesses,

however, were her parents and Dr. Creason.

In any event, the

testimony of plaintiff's parents could have no relevance concerning the reputation of plaintiff and defendant in the community of Galveston.

Plaintiff failed to produce any Texas

friends or acquaintances who could testify about the reputation
of the parties in Galveston, Texas.

There was, therefore, an

essential element of her case on which there was no credible
evidence.

In re Estate of Bivians, supra; Walter v. Walter,

supra.
3.

Plaintiff presented no evidence of an agree-

ment to marry in Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff presented no evidence

that there was an agreement to marry entered into in the state of
Pennsylvania by uttering words in the present tense with an intent to establish a marital relationship.

Commonwealth v.

At her earlier deposition, Miss Hough stated she
could identify no one. T. Vol. I, p. 200, R. 1364.
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Sullivan, supra.

In fact, Miss Hough's Second Amended Complaint

is proof in itself that there was no agreement to marry since she
can not state with any degree of particularity whenf or where the
g
alleged marriage took place.
In addition, it is highly unlikely
that, after residing in the state of Texas without the benefit of
marriage, the parties would enter into a common law marriage in
the state of Pennsylvania, particularly in view of the attitude
of her parents toward the relationship and since, in addition, a
ceremonial wedding had been discussed and rejected.

T. Vol. II,

p. 97, R. 1487.
4.

Plaintiff presented no evidence regarding the

reputation of the plaintiff and the defendant in the state of
Pennsylvania.

Miss Hough presented no evidence upon which the

court could determine the reputation of the parties in Havertown,
Pennsylvania, the area in which they lived.
essential to plaintiff's case.

Such evidence is

Van Brakle v. Lanauze, supra.

The only evidence plaintiff introduced were two employment
applications and testimony relating to the filing of a joint tax
return.

Defendant admitted execution of the employment applica-

It is foolish to believe that, as plaintiff contended, the parties were married in each of the states of Texas,
Pennsylvania, Montana and Colorado. R. 835-836. If a marriage did occur, it would be a useless act to repeat that
marriage in subseguent states. Further, if the parties were
married, why doesn't the plaintiff know whether they were
married in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana or Colorado?
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tions but testified that they were sent to the states of Utah and
Colorado, in anticipation of marriage to the plaintiff, and that
they were not shown or distributed to any one in the state of
Pennsylvania.

T. Vol* II, p. 102, R. 1492*

The Internal Revenue

Agent and Miss Hough both testified that the subject tax return
was filed in the state of Texas, not Pennsylvania.
154, Vol. II, p. 6, R. 1318, 1396.

T. Vol. I, p.

At best, those documents

would constitute mere isolated instances and not meet the requirement of a general reputation and constant holding out of
marriage.

See p. 28-29 of this Brief.

Since, however, none of

those documents were ever circulated in Pennsylvania they could
not possibly constitute a representation of marriage in that
state and were not probative of the parties' reputation in
Pennsylvania.

7

Plaintiff further testified that the parties sent

out a joint Christmas card, but made no statement concerning
how they represented themselves on that card.
R. 1181.

T. Vol. I, p. 17,

Barbara Evans, however, testified that she received

Christmas cards from plaintiff and defendant and that there was
nothing on those cards to indicate in any manner that the parties
were married to each other.

T. Vol, II, p. 198-199, R.

Defendant objected to the exhibits because they were
never circulated in Pennsylvania, the state in which the
representation of marriage must be established in order to
have a common law marriage in that state. T. Vol I, p.
19-20, R. 1183-1184.
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1587a-1588.

There was also no evidence that any of the cards

were distributed in Pennsylvania.
Although the failure of plaintiff to present any
evidence relating to an agreement to become married in
Pennsylvania was fatal to her claim of a valid common law
marriage in that state, the additional failure of plaintiff to
establish the reputation of the parties in the community was a
second mortal blow.
5.

See, In re Craddocks Casef supra.

Plaintiff failed to show a common law marriage

in the state of Montana.

Plaintiff failed to present any evi-

dence relating to an agreement to marry in the state of Montana.
As a result, t\ve trial court could not find that there was a
common law marriage entered into in that state, since, under
Montana law, there must be a specific agreement to marry and it
must take place immediately.
supra.

Matter of the Estate of Peltomaa,

Plaintiff also failed to produce any competent evidence

relating to the reputation of the parties in the community.

Al-

though plaintiff testified that she was introduced as the defendant's wife at a reception to which "hundreds" of people attended, the town of Hot Springs, Montana, where plaintiff and
defendant lived, actually had a total population of only 450
people.

Defendant testified that about 25 people were at the

reception and that at no time did he introduce plaintiff as his
wife.

In addition, Dr. Colley testified that both Peggy
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Heinselman and Chloe Roosma, whose testimony is set out hereinafterf were also at that reception.

T. Vol. II, p. 103, R. 1493.

They clearly refuted plaintiff's claim.
6.

Plaintiff failed to prove a common law mar-

riage in the state of Colorado.

Plaintiff's evidence failed to

establish a common law marriage in the state of Colorado.

In

fact, plaintiff did not ever testify that there had been an
agreement to marry between plaintiff and defendant entered into
in that state.

As such Miss Hough totally failed to meet her

burden of proof since an agreement to marry entered into in
Colorado is fundamental to the creation of a marriage in that
state.

Graham v. Graham, supra.

Plaintiff also totally failed

to present any competent evidence concerning the reputation of
the parties in Denver.

To establish the reputation of the

parties it was necessary for Miss Hough to show the understanding
among the neighbors and acquaintances with whom the parties
associated in their daily lives that they were living together as
husband and wife.

Graham v. Graham, supra.

This she failed to

do.
Although plaintiff did present a copy of a Deed relating
to the purchase of ground in the state of Colorado in the name of
Joel Colley and Robin Hough Colley, husband and wife, the defendant testified, without contradiction, that the document had been
prepared by someone other than himself, that he had signed the
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document without reviewing it closely, having rushed to the title
company from the hospital and then promptly returned to work.
Dr. Colley further testified that he did not believe that by
signing the documents he was entering into any kind of a marital
relationship with Miss Hough.

T. Vol. IIy p. 115-116.

Since there was no evidence of either a new agreement to
become married in the state of Colorado, or of the reputation of
the parties among their friends and acquaintances in Colorado,
there could be no common law marriage in that state.
G.

The evidence presented by defendant overwhelmingly

supports the finding of the trial court that there was no common
law marriage.

The trial court specifically found that plaintiff

and defendant "did not agree between themselves to be married and
did not sufficiently hold themselves out to the public as husband
and wife to meet the requirements of a common law marriage" and
that "there was no common law marriage between these parties."
R. 1078.

Dr. Colley produced, at trial, a large quantum of evi-

dence which more than adequately supports the trial court's
ruling.
1.

Miss Hough consistently used her maiden name

throughout her relationship with defendant.

The uncontroverted

evidence showed that Miss Hough was known as Robin Hough in each
of the states in which the parties resided.
that she always used her maiden name.
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Miss Hough admitted

T. Vol. I. p. 114-115, R.

1278-1279.

As a matter of fact, plaintiff even filed this action

in the name of Hough.

R. 2-3.

Without repeating the facts

relating to plaintiff's continuous use of her maiden name,
suffice it to say that the record is replete with testimony and
evidence in that regard.

T. Vol. I, p. 79-84, 112-114, 116-119,

R. 1243-1248, 1276-1278, 1280-1283, Ex's 41-52, 57-69.

See also,

pages 3-5 of this Brief.
It is undisputed that in each of the communities, the
plaintiff was known exclusively as Robin Hough.

At the trial she

produced no charge cards, driver's licenses, bank accounts,
social security cards or other such documents in the name of
Robin Colley.

In addition, as pointed out hereafter, when she.

applied for a passport, she did so as Robin Hough, a woman who
had never been married.

The fact that Miss Hough continued to be

known, throughout her association with defendant, as Miss Hough
is strong evidence that there was no marriage.

Gary v. Gary,

supra.
2.

The competent evidence showed that the reputa-

tion of the parties in Montana was that of not being married.
Chloe Roosma and Peggy Heinselman, two long-time residents of Hot
Springs, Montana, testified by way of deposition.
316, R. 1703.

T. Vol. II, p.

Their testimony conclusively established that the

reputation of plaintiff and defendant in the town of Hot Springs,
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Montana was that of not being married.

Peggy Heinselmanr who

knew plaintiff and defendant socially and who had attended "more
than several" social affairs with themr Depo. Heinselman p. 14,
testified that she had never heard Miss Hough introduced by Dr.
Colley as his wife and that she had never heard either one of
them say that they were married.

Depo. Heinselman p. 7.

She

further testified that it was clear to her that the marital
status of Miss Hough and Dr. Colley was that they were not
married.

Mrs. Heinselman stated that there were factions in the

community that disagreed with the lifestyle of plaintiff and
defendant and that by that she meant that they were living together and were not married.

Depo. Heinselman p. 8.

In answer

to the question, "Can you tell me whether or not the reputation
of Joel Colley and Robin Hough in the community of Hot Springs is
one of being married or of not being married?"
answered, "Not being married."

Mrs. Heinselman

Depo. Heinselman p. 6.

Mrs.

Heinselman further testified that in discussions with plaintiff,
Miss Hough referred to Dr. Colley as "someone she was living
with."

Depo. Heinselman p. 12.
Chloe Roosma who had lived in Hot Springs for 23 years

when plaintiff and defendant came to town, testified that the
reputation of the parties in the community of Hot Springs was
that of not being married.

Depo. Roosma p. 8.

She testified

that she had never heard plaintiff use the last name of Colleyf
had never heard her introduce herself as Robin Colley or as Mrs.

-44-

Joel Colley and that she did not know off and had never heard of,
anyone refer to Robin as Joel's wife or Joel as Robin's husband.
Depo* Roosma p. 8-9.

She further testified that the community

did not approve of the lifestyle or the living arrangements between plaintiff and defendant, and that their lifestyle was not
satisfactory to the norms or standards of Hot Springs.
Roosma p. 9-10.

Depo.

Miss Hough presented no contrary testimony.
3.

The passport application of plaintiff conclu-

sively shows that there was no common law marriage.

In 1974,

Miss Hough executed a passport application, wherein she stated,
under oath, that she had never been married.

Ex. 55.

This is

conclusive proof that plaintiff herself knew that the parties had
never entered into a common law marriage and that her allegations
to the contrary are recent fabrications generated solely for
monetary gain.

Plaintiff lamely attempted to explain the state-

ment away by contending that the parties had agreed to travel on
separate passports, a contention vigorously disputed by defendant.

T. Vol. II, p. 107, R. 1271.

There was, however, no evi-

dence introduced by Miss Hough to show that it was necessary for
her to state that she had never been married in order to obtain
her own passport.

Thus, the sworn statement by plaintiff that

she had never been married conclusively establishes that there
had not been a marriage between plaintiff and defendant in Texas,
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Pennsylvania or Montana.
4.
marriage.

Plaintifffs conduct showed that there was no

When Miss Hough and Dr. Colley visited her grandmother

in Oklahoma, they were confronted by sobbing accusations that
they were living in sin.

T. Vol. IIf p. 109, R. 1499.

Did Miss

Hough deny those allegations or do anything to alleviate her
grandmother's concerns?

No!

The parties tried to explain the

situation to her and then left because they were causing her a
great deal of hurt and pain.

T. Vol. II, p. 110r R. 1500. Sure-

ly, if Miss Hough believed that she was married to Dr. Colley,
she would have informed her own grandmother of that fact and thus
avoided an unpleasant situation.

The fact that she said nothing

indicates that, as the court found, the parties had never
married.
5.

Miss Hough herself admitted that she was not

married to the defendant.

Barbara K. Evans, defendant's cousin,

testified that in 1976 she had a telephone conversation with the
plaintiff wherein Miss Hough stated to her that she (Miss Hough)
was considering getting married to Dr. Colley.

Ms. Evans further

testified that in the spring of 1981, she had another telephone
conversation with Miss Hough wherein Miss Hough stated that she
(Miss Hough) would like to have a baby but she did not want to

Defendant's proffered, Ex. 74, was another passport
application executed by plaintiff in 1980 wherein Miss Hough
again stated, under oath, that she had never been married.
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get married so that would be a stumbling block to having children.

T. Vol. II, p. 202-203, R. 1591-1592.

In addition, Ms.

Evans in response to the question, "Did Robin ever indicate to
you in any fashion that she considered herself to be married to
Dr. Colley?"

Stated, "No."
6.

T. Vol. II, p. 205, R. 1594.

Not only did the plaintiff fail to meet her

burden of proof, the evidence clearly showed that there was no
common law marriage between the parties.

In the instant case,

plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof.

She produced no

credible evidence relating to either an agreement of marriage or
a reputation of marriage in any of the states in which the
parties resided.

Dr. Colley, on the other hand, presented

voluminous evidence showing that the parties were not married.
Thus, the trial court was clearly correct in its determination
that no common law marriage occurred between the parties.
such, that finding must be upheld by this Court.

As

The whole

marriage issue could have been easily resolved by Miss Hough had
she not declined Dr. Colley1s request that she marry him.
Vol. II, p. 113-115, R. 1503-1505.

T.

To paraphrase the Court in

Miller v. Sutherland, supra, "At any time over a period of (nine)
years

Miss Hough could have had the benefit of a ceremonial

marriage had she desired it.

She did not desire it, that was her

decision."
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H.

Defendant was prevented, by the trial court, from

presenting numerous items of competent evidence showing no common
law marriage existed.

Prior to the trial, the court ruled,

defendant believes erroneously, that Dr. Colley could not present
any evidence relating to matters that occurred in the state of
Utah for the purpose of proving or disproving the existence of
the common law marriage.

R. 585-586. Although defendant
9
vigorously protested that ruling, the finding of the trial court
that no common law marriage existed made that issue moot, as far
as he is concerned on this appeal.

If by some chance, however,

this Court is inclined to overturn the factual finding of the
trial court with relation to the common law marriage issue, the
refusal by the trial court to accept defendant's evidence would
then be material.
At the time of trial, defendant proffered another passport application executed by plaintiff in 1980 wherein plaintiff
again stated, under oath, that she had never been married.
74.

Ex.

Defendant further proffered several trust deeds, prepared

under the direction of plaintiff, to Miss Robin Hough.
& 109.

Exs. 108

The defendant also proffered the testimony of Mrs. Jane

Wertz that the reputation of plaintiff and defendant in the

Dr. Colley1s petition for an Interlocutory Appeal was
denied. Supreme Court #20233.
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neighborhood in Salt Lake City was that the plaintiff and
defendant were living together but that they were not married.
Defendant also, under the Court's ruling, proffered the testimony
of Susan Chesteen, who had known both the plaintiff and the
defendant since they moved to Salt Lake City.

She stated that

Miss Hough's reputation among the Medical Wives Auxiliary of the
University of Utah was that of not being married to Dr. Colley,
that, in fact, it was no secret that they were not married and
that some of the wives in the Auxiliary were upset about Miss
Hough being allowed into that organization.

T. Vol. II, p. 222,

R. 1611.
The testimony of Mr. Robert Hixson was also proffered.
He stated that he had a conversation with Miss Hough in the
spring of 1981, wherein Miss Hough told him that she was not married.

T. Vol. II, p. 231, R. 1619.

Mr. Ronald Radcliffe, by way

of proffer, stated that he had had various conversations with
Miss Hough wherein Miss Hough stated to him that she was not
married and that at no time did she purport to be married to Dr.
Colley.

T. Vol. II, p. 249, R. 1637.

In addition, defendant was

instructed by the Court to make a written proffer of the testimony he was precluded from presenting at the time of trial.
Vol. II, p. 318, R. 1705.
- 878.

Defendant made such a proffer.

T.

R. 873

The proffered testimony, if admitted, would have shown
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that Miss Hough specifically represented herself to numerous
people in Salt Lake City as not being married to Dr. Colley; that
in January, 1982, she stated, on her employment questionnaire
that she was not married and designated Dr. Colley as her
"friend".

Defendant's proffer also included Exhibits 69, 71, 72,

73, 74, 105, 106, and 107.

Those documents generally show that

the plaintiff purchased airline tickets and traveled under the
name of Robin Hough; that she was listed in the Salt Lake City
Phone Directory from 1976 to 1981 as Robin Hough; that she
registered at various motels as Robin Hough; rented a car as
Robin Hough; maintained bank accounts in the name of Robin Hough;
purchased various items under the name of Robin Hough; purchased
real property under the name of "Robin Hough, an unmarried
woman;" had a Utah driver's license under the name of Robin Hough
and generally conducted business and entered into transactions in
Utah exclusively under the name of Robin Hough.
In addition, defendant was prohibited from presenting
any evidence relating to his marriage to his present wife.
Vol. II, p. 179, 258-259, R. 1569, 1646-1647.

T.

That testimony

would have been particularly significant since the law recognizes
a presumption that a ceremonial marriage is valid and thus,
plaintiff would have had the burden of overcoming not only the
presumption against the change in status of a meretricious
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relationship, but also the presumption that Dr. Colley's
ceremonial marriage in 1982 to his present wifef Donna, was
valid.

Muillinax v. Muillinax, 447 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.

1969); Baker v. Lee, 337 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. 1960); Martin v.
Martin, 29 Utah 2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973); Shepard & Pierson
Co. v. Baker, 262 P. 887 (Mont. 1927).
I.

Plaintiff's contention that Ex. 117 should have been

admitted is erroneous.

Plaintiff argues that Ex. 117 should have

been admitted by the Court.

Plaintiff cleverly attaches a photo

copy of that exhibit to her brief so that the contents of the
exhibit will not go unnoticed by this Court.

Defendant submits,

however, that the ruling of the trial court was correct.

Prior

to attempting to admit the exhibit the plaintiff stated that she
had kept a file of newspaper articles because she felt that the
newspaper had committed libel and slander.
1603.

T. Vol. I, p. 214, R.

The court correctly perceived that it would be inconsis-

tent for Miss Hough to contend on one hand that the newspaper had
been guilty of libel and slander, and on the other to admit the
newspaper article in support of her contention of a common law
marriage.

Beyond that, however, the newspaper article was not

authenticated by anyone.

If admitted, defendant would have had

no opportunity to cross examine anyone concerning it.

Certainly,

it would be important to know upon what information its author,
Lenore Brown, made the statements that she apparently made.
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Was

the newspaper article an "in" joke amongst the residents of Hot
Springs?

Was the newspaper actually published and distributed?

If so, to whom?

Plaintiff's argument that the article should

have been admitted pursuant to Rule 803 (19) of Utah Rules of
Evidence is most curious since Miss Hough successfully blocked
much of the direct testimony of Ms. Evans, relating to the
reputation of the plaintiff and defendant among the members of
Dr. Colley's family, by contending that the exception provided by
that Rule did not apply.

The article is inadequate, however, for

the purpose of fitting within the exception of that Rule.

Plain-

tiff's claim that the article is a "business record" is absurd.
Even it if were, however, there must be someone to lay the proper
foundation for that exception to the hearsay rule.
produced no one.

Plaintiff

The last claim by plaintiff is that the docu-

ment was admissible under Rule 803 (24). Suffice it to say that
plaintiff presented none of the arguments that she makes to this
Court at the time that the document was refused.

In addition,

the plaintiff failed to make the existence of the document known
to the defendant in advance of the trial and failed to provide
the defendant with the fair opportunity to prepare to meet it
that that Rule requires.

Thus, its exclusion was clearly proper.
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Ill
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS A
PARTNERSHIP IS WHOLLY LACKING
As with the supposed marriage, Miss Hough conveniently
ignores the specifics and apparently argues that a partnership
between the parties must have occurred "somewhere."

She does

not, however, state precisely when or where the partnership was
formed, nor does she identify the business of the partnership.
A.
partnership.

Since there was no business for profit, there was no
The record is totally devoid of any evidence that

the parties operated a business for profit in the state of Texas,
where both were full time college students.

At that time, Miss

Hough was unemployed and her only income was an "allowance" from
her parents.

Since there was no business operated by the

parties, by definition, there could be no partnership.
Similarly, there is no testimony of any business for a
profit conducted by the parties in either Pennsylvania, Montana,
Arkansas or Colorado.

Rather, the evidence showed that Miss

Hough maintained separate employment as an occupational therapist
with her separate business accounts, while Dr. Colley was
employed as a physician.

Since a partnership is a business for a

profit, it was incumbent upon Miss Hough to identify the
partnership business conducted by the parties in the various

For a discussion of the activities conducted in Utah
see Appellant's Brief, p. 11-12.
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states.

This she totally failed to do.
B

»

The findings of the trial court are not supported by

competent evidence.

Plaintiff argues that the Findings of the

trial court were based upon "a wealth of substantial and credible
evidence."

Rather than cite to any specifics in the record, how-

ever, plaintiff merely reiterates the Findings made by the court.
The defendant acknowledges that such Findings were in fact made,
however, the Findings are not supported by the record.

For

instance, where is there any evidence in the record that Miss
Hough would devote all of her time and talents to the property
and that Dr. Colley would contribute money but that both would
share on an equal basis?

Plaintiff cites none.

Defendant has

previously cited to the precise testimony of plaintiff which is
at variance with this Finding by the trial court. Appellant's
Brief, p. 14-16.
C.

Plaintiff's contention that there was an agreement

between the parties requiring a distribution other than as provided by statute is not supported by the record.

Miss Hough

argues, for the first time on appeal, that she had an agreement
with Dr. Colley that any distribution of proceeds from the
partnership would be divided differently than is required by
§48-1-15 and §48-1-37 Utah Code Annotated.

Miss Hough again

fails, however, to state precisely when and where such an
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agreement took place.

Was it in Texas, Pennsylvania, Montana,

Arkansas, Colorado, or Utah?

Plaintiff apparently relies upon

her testimony that while the parties were in Montana they discussed that if anything happens "half is yours and half is mine,"
but she does not state what partnership business was purportedly
being conducted in Montana.

Miss Hough also testified that there

were "similar conversations" in Denver and in Salt Lake City, but
similarly fails to identify any partnership business.

Even if

the testimony of plaintiff is believed, however, merely agreeing
that property should be divided one-half to each party is a long
way from an agreement that the capital contributions of Dr.
Colley would not be returned to him, and it is a guantum leap
away from the assertion that the legitimate obligations incurred
to finance the property would not be repaid out of "partnership"
assets.

In deed, an agreement to divide property on a 50-50

basis is no more than is presumed by general partnership law.
Zyck v. Hartford Ins. Group, 150 N.J. Super. 431, 375 A.2d 1232
(1977); Presutti v. Presutti, 270 Md.193, 310 A.2d 791 (1973); 1^
S. Rowley on Partnerships §18.0 p. 447 (2d Ed. 1960).

It cannot,

therefore, constitute an agreement to distribute contrary to the
statute as Miss Hough contends.
Plaintiff incorrectly relies upon the case, Bridgeman v.
Winsness, 34 Utah 383, 98 P. 186 (1908).

That case held, among

other things, that the existence of a partnership may be implied
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under certain circumstances.

Plaintiff apparently claims, on the

one hand, that there was an implied partnership based upon the
conduct of the parties.

Resp. Br. p. 18.

She also argues,

however, that there was a specific agreement to distribute the
property contrary to the statutes.

It must be obvious that those

positions are inconsistent with each other.

If there was an

implied partnership, there could not have been a specific
distribution agreement as plaintiff contends.

If there was a

specific agreement of distribution, it does not make sense that
none of the other terms of the "partnership" were ever spelled
out.
Miss Hough's reliance upon the testimony of Jean
Lambert, Donald Heinig and Wirt Hines is also misplaced.

The

testimony of Mr. Heinig and Mr. Hines, taken in the light most
favorable to Miss Hough, was that on two occasions Dr. Colley had
indicated that whatever had been acquired by the parties would be
divided "50-50."

T. Vol. II, p. 56-57, 72.

The testimony of

June Ellen Thomas Lambert was even narrower in scope.

Her

testimony was that Dr. Colley had stated that in the event of a
separation, the house would be divided equally.
p.63.

T. Vol. II,

Defendant objected to the testimony since it did not

relate to an actual agreement between the parties, but was merely
an expression of what Dr. Colley, at that time, was willing to
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do.

T. Vol. II, p. 56, R. 1446.

testimony.

The Court, however, allowed the

T. Vol. II, p. 382, R. 1769.

Nowhere did either the plaintiff, or any of her witnesses, testify that there was a specific agreement between Dr.
Colley and Miss Hough, that in the event of separation, Miss
Hough would be entitled to half of the gross estate that had been
acguired.

Similarly, the record is totally devoid of any evi-

dence that Dr. Colley had agreed that he would be left with all
of the debts and obligations of the "partnership" and that Miss
Hough would get off scot free.

That, however, is precisely the

result of the trial court's erroneous ruling.
D.

The distribution of the assets of the relationship,

ordered by the court, is grossly disproportionate and
inequitable.

There is no dispute that Dr. Colley borrowed money

from his retirement trust and put it into the properties.
Hough's counsel freely admitted as such.

Miss

T. Vol. Ill, p. 14-15.

See also Ex. 94, R. 1114-1128.
Miss Hough's contention that the trial court did not
deny Dr. Colley reimbursement for the loans made to the partnership is simply not true.

The trial court originally found that

any mortgages signed by both parties, and the liabilities
thereon, would be recognized.

R. 1080.

The trial court also

ordered that obligations owed to third-parties would be paid and
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that the remaining net proceeds would be divided between the
parties.

R. 1083.
Dr. Colley vigorously protested the refusal of the court

to order the repayment of all of the money borrowed from the
retirement trust, but felt some consolation in the decision of
the trial court that the liabilities relating to mortgages
executed by both of the parties would be paid.

The trial court,

however, subsequently changed its mind and now has ordered that
the subject mortgages will be paid, only to the extent that there
is any equity in the properties.

R. approx. 1865-1867.

Dr.

Colley contends that this further compounds the error made by the
court, since all debts of the "partnership" must be repaid before
any "partner" is entitled to any portion of the assets.

1 S.

Rowley, supra, §40(b) p. 760.
There is nothing in the record to justify the conclusion
that the parties agreed to a distribution of the assets of the
"partnership" other than as provided by statute.

In deed, even

if such an agreement existed, it could not extinguish the obligation of the "partnership" to repay %he funds borrowed from the
profit sharing trust.

There can be no doubt that rf there was a

partnership between the parties, the funds borrowed by Dr. Colley
from the profit sharing trust are an obligation of that partnership.

The funds were used in the acquisition or maintenance of

the properties and plaintiff herself, prior to the commencement
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of litigation, recognized those loans as an obligation of the
parties.

Ex. 28, a copy of which is included at A8 to All.

Miss

Hough now contends, however, that since she did not personally
sign the Promissory Notes, she was not obligated to repay the
debt.

Such, however, is contrary to the law of this state.

In

Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901),
this Court held that an obligation incurred by one partner may be
enforced against the other partner.

In that case, Andrews, a

partner of Hawke, was obligated to repay money that had been
borrowed by Hawke and used in their business even though the
letter by which the money was borrowed was signed only by Hawke.
This Court stated,
In a trading partnership, a partner may enter into
any contract or engagement for the firm in its
ordinary trade or business, and may buy, sell, or
pledge goods, borrow money, or do any other acts
incident or appropriate to such business according
to the ordinary course or usage thereof.
This Court further stated,
When • • . money is borrowed by one member of a
firm on the credit of the firm, according to the
usual course of business, within the general scope
of its authority, the partnership is liable
therefore.
Finally this Court concluded,
Nor, where a transaction of one partner is for the
firm and within the general or apparent scope of
the partnership business, is it a matter of any
consequence that the writing evidencing the transaction is signed with the name of the individual
partner only.
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It is undisputed that Dr. Colley was the only person
that could borrow from the retirement trust.
R. 1693.

T. Vol. IIy p. 306f

Neither is it disputed that over $104,000 was borrowed

and that those funds were used for the acquisition or maintenance
of the properties in question.

The Promissory Notes executed by

Dr. Colley, Ex. 94, make specific reference to the individual
parcels of property which were pledged as security for the
obligations.

There can be no question that, if there was a

partnership, the funds were used in the usual course of its
business.
The fact that the properties may have declined in value
can relate only to the issue of the security to satisfy the loan,
but can not extinguish the debt.

Thus, the refusal of the trial

court to order the repayment of the entire obligation was clearly
in error.

In addition, the determination by the court that Dr.

Colley, in some fashion, was obligated to indemnify Miss Hough
for any obligations owed to the retirement trust that were not
secured by a mortgage executed by both parties, has no basis in
the law.

See, R. 1105-1106.
E.

Selective application of partnership principals to

unmarried co-habitants is improper.

Miss Hough argues that Dr.

If a partnership existed it must have been a trading
partnership since Miss Hough makes five separate references
in her brief to buying, selling or trading properties.
Resp. Br. p. 11, 17, 18, 19, 40.
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Dr. Colley has not attempted to identify the legal nature of the
relationship between the parties.

Apparently, plaintiff failed

to read pages 31-40 of Appellant's Brief.

The problem in this

case is that the trial court has attempted to deal with and
adjudicate the rights of unmarried co-habitating parties by carefully selecting certain portions of the Partnership Act while
ignoring others.

Plaintiff has been more than willing to

cooperate with the trial court in such a charade.

Defendant

suggests, however, that Miss Hough can not have it both ways. If
there was a partnership, Miss Hough is responsible for one-half
of the partnership debts and Dr. Colley must be reimbursed for
his expenditures relating to the property.

Section 48-1-15(2),

U.C.A.; Meredith Development v. Bennett, 444 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. App.
1969).

If there was no partnership, plaintiff is not entitled to

any of the property since, prior to the commencement of the
action, Miss Hough had guit-claimed any interest she had to Dr.
Colley.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving that a
common law marriage existed between the parties.

The evidence in

this case clearly supports the findings of the trial court that
there was no such marriage.

There is no competent evidence in
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the record to support the finding of the trial court that the
defendant was to assume the entire financial obligation relating
to the relationship between the parties.

The trial court's re-

fusal to repay the money that was borrowed to acquire the properties and to pay the other funds that were personally provided by
Dr. Colley to maintain the properties after Miss Hough walked
out, is clearly error.

As the situation now stands, the obliga-

tions of the "partnership" remain unpaid, Miss Hough has received
half of the gross assets of the "partnership" but has incurred
none of the liabilities.

Dr. Colley, on the other hand, has been

saddled with all of the liabilities and has been forced to "bite
the bullet" on all of the money that he advanced to maintain the
properties after Miss Hough left.

Even under plaintiff's theory

of the case, one would be hard pressed to say that the assets of
the "partnership" have been divided equally between the parties.
The findings and judgment of the trial court relating to
the marriage issue should be sustained, but the distribution of
the assets under a claim of partnership must be reversed.

DATED this

day of August, 1986.

Respectfully submitted,

J. THOMAS BOWEN
Attorney for Appellant
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TAYLOU v. TAVLOIi.

sustained, the abandonment must be shown
by a preponderance of proof. Especially
should this rule be Invoked and strictly enforced In a case like that at bar, where it
is claimed parties had abandoned a water
right shown to be of great value, after 20
years' user of It, and immediately after a
solemn decree of court confirming their ti\ tie to it. No necessity exists for a review in
j detail of the evidence presented, and such a
?
course would extend this opinion beyond any
\ reasonable limits. It is sufficient to say that
the evidence wholly falls to show, by a pru! pendent uce of proof, the existence of any
\ one element necessary to constitute abaudon\ nient. That which tends to substantiate it,
I as plaintiffs claim, is too vague, indefinite,
\ and uncertain. Intention, for instance, Is
I the very essence of abandonment, and the
\ latent of defendants to abandon is not shown
jl to have existed at any time. The mere fact,
I conclusively shown and really not disputed,
I Unit during each year, from IKS2 to ltfUO, the
I lauds lying under the Lincoln ditch were
I cultivated, and produced a crop by the use
j of water from the Big Fountain, transportI ed through the ditch In question, conclusively
I allowN that there was no abandonment, and
| outweighs all of the evidence of plaintIftV
I witnesses based upon their surmises and
I opinions. This cannot !>o controverted by
| the mere opinions of witnesses that, If more
I water had been used, better ami larger crops
I could have been raised. The mere fact that
I pin-lies cultivating lands under the Lincoln
! diteh did not see lit, in a time of scarcity, to
| shut down their uclghl>ors' ditches, and seek
I to enforce their right to all of the water
i awarded to them, cannot be held to raise a
I presumption that they Intended to abandon
I tliilr rights under the decree in whole or In
1 (tftrt. Where a question of abandonment is
| Involved, If presumptions are to be indulged
| In, they will be against the party asserting
k It. The findings were In accord with the
I proofs, and, perceiving no error, the JudgI meat will be afiirmed. Aliirmed.

I
TAYLOIt v. TAYLOR.
* (Court of Appeals of Colorado. Nov. 8, 1807.)
I

COMMON-LAW MAKUMOK—KVIOKNOS.

* A common-in w uiiirrintfc \H not shown by n>
M regular cohabitation and partial reputation.
i Error to district court, Ijike county.
J Action by Pnrneey Taylor against George
I I Taylor. Judgment for defendant. Plain|(Iff brings error.
Affirmed.
f k. J. Sterling and A. S. Blake, for plaintiff
J a error. Charles Cavender and John A.
fEwing, for defendant in error.
i WILSON, J. This was an action for dlMoree and alimony, instituted by the plainJ -ff in error. It is ad mi l ted that no marriage
!tfeuiuuy was performed, and that there

i
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[ was no compliance had or attempted with
I lie statutory provisions as to the solemnization of marriage. It was alleged iu the complaint, and attempted to be shown, that a
marriage was created by a verbal agreement of the parties, followed bjr cohabitation for a period of about four years, ami
general repute. All material allegations
were denied by a verified answer. The issues were found in favor of the defendant,
and judgment rendered dismissing the bill.
This case was before this court heretofore,
on an application for alimony pendente lite,
and in the course of its opinion denying the
application the court said: "We are unable to discover errors which leave the impression that they are of suilicieut importance to compel a reversal of the judgment,
unless we accept counsel's proposition that
the Judgment is not supported by the evidence." Taylor v. Taylor, 7 Colo. A pp. 541),
-1-J l'ac. <>7f>. We still adhere to the same
views, ami hence the only question to be
now considered is whether there was sutttclent evidence to support the judgment.
Ily the statutes of Colorado, marriage is declared to be a civil contract; and there 1st
only oue essential requirement to Its validity,
between parties capable of contracting, viz.
the consent of the parties. There are certain statutory provisions as to IUVII.NO, eertiilcates, record, ami authority to perform
the marriage ceremony, etc.; but uowheie is
a marriage declared to be void because it
was uot contracted in accordance with these
provisions, or was contracted lu violation of
them. It follows, therefore, that a marriage
contract, between parties of contracting capacity, which possesses the one esseutial
prerequisite, may be valid, although no provision of the statute as to its solemnization
may have been followed, or attempted tohave been followed. In other words, in this
state a marriage simply by agreement of the
parties, followed by cohabitation as hushaiut
and wife, und such other attendant circumstances as are necessary to constitute what
Is termed a "common-law marriage," maybe valid and binding. Does the evidence in
tliis case show that such a marriage was
contracted between the parties'/ The great
weight of authority Is that the contract alone
is not suilicieut, unless it is followed by Its
consummation; that is, by cohabitation as
husband and wife. It is also agreed that In
cases where the contract or agreemeut is
denied, and cannot be shown, its existence
may be proven by, and presumed from, evidence of cohabitation as husband and wife,
and general repute.
"Cohabitation," a s
here used, means something more than sexual intercourse. Bouvier defines "cohabit"
to be "to live together iu I he same house,
claiming to be married." Webster define*
"cohabitation" as "the act or state of dwelling together, or in the same place with another." "It is not a sojourn, uor a habit of visiting, nor even a remaining with for a time.

A-6
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None of those fall wlthiu the true idea of co- experience had been Imposed upon and dehabitation as a fact presumptive of mar- ceived, the court would feel impelled by evriage. • • * To cohabit is to live or dwell ery dictate of right and justice, a s well as
together, to have the same habitation; so by the settled rules ami principles of law, to
that, where one lives and dwells, there does shield and protect innocence, so far as withthe other live and dwell with him." Yard- in its power, by indulging in every possible
ley's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 211. tty "general j presumption'in its favor. This is far from
reputation or repute" Is meant the under* being such a case, however.
At the time
standing among the neighbors and nc<|uuiul- when the pretended contract w a s made, aud
auees with whom the parties associate in the connection with defendant begun, plaintheir daily life that they are living together tiff w a s 38 years of age; had been twice
as husband and wife, and not in meretri- married, and as many times divorced; had
cious Intercourse. "In its application to the been an actress for 1!0 years, ami traveled
fact of marriage, it is more than mere hear- much; and. according to her o w n testimony,
say.
It Involves, and is made up of, social
had previously had a wide ami varied expeconduct and recognition, giving character to rience, aside from that mairintouiai.
The
an admitted and unconcealed cohabitation." judgment is aliirmed.
Atiirnied.
Kadger v. Badger, 8S N. Y. 55b\ It is necessary that there be evidence both of cohabitation and reputation before such a marriage can be presumed. Proof of one alone
BREVOOUT • . H U G H E S .
is not sullicicut to sustain the prcsumptiou. (Court of Appeals of Colorado. Nov. 8, 1807.)
Com. v. Stump, 53 Pa. &t. Kill. As was said l i n . i . s i \ i > N » » T I : M - - 1 ' A I I . I HI; OV C O N S U M M A T I O N —
In the Yurdley's Estate Case, above cited:
KVIIIKNOU —CoNTKNTS lUf Luhl' l.N"The Scotch expression conveys the true
s rue MI. NT.
1. Where a uote was given in fulfillment of
idea, perhaps better than our own,—tin* 'haba
subscription
in
aid
u street railway, the fact
it aim! repute* of marriage. Thus, when wo that the company did ofnut
fulfill all of tlie obligasee a man and woman constantly living to- tions contained in I lie mib*criptiou agreement
gelher,—where one Is dwelling, there the oth- shows hut u partial failure of consideration, uud
er constantly dwells with him,—-we obtain is iusutlieieui to supuort a judgment for defendant.
the ilrst idea or tirst step in the prcsump2. The existence of the original subscription
tiou of marriage; and w h e n w e add to tills agreement having been shown by testimony of
that the parties so constantly living together the persona in whose custody it was, further testimony that he had loat the paper, aud that he
are reputed to be man and wife, ami so tak- had
made search for it in such places as it was
en ami received by all who know them both, likely to be without success, is suilleieut to justiw e take the second thought or second step fy the admission of secondary evidence as to its
in the presumption of the fact of a marriage. contents.
Marriage Is Lite cause; these follow as the efAppeal from district court, Arapahoe counfect
When the full thought contained in ty.
these words, 'cohabitation' and 'reputation
Action by W. H. Brevoort against Thomas
of marriage,' is embraced, w e discover that P. Hughes. There was judgment fur dean inconstant habitation and a divided repu- fendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
tation of marriage carry with them no full
H. C. Van Seha&ck, for appellant.
belief of a n antecedent marriage as the
cause.
The irregularity in these elements
WILSON, I. Defendant, Hughes, subscribof evidence Is at once a reason to think there
ed $r><H> to aid in the construction of au elecIs Irregularity in the life itself the parties
tric railway from the business portion of the
lead, unless attended by independent facts
city of Denver, along Eighth street, to the
which aid in the proof of a marriage. Witht o w n of Mouteluir. The original subscripout concomitant facts to prove marriage,
tion agreement w a s In writiug, and was signsuch an irregular cohabllatlou ami partial
ed by the defendant. In furtherance of his
reputation of marriage avail nothing In the
j subscription, he executed three several prtuuproof of marriage." Apply lug these rules
issory notes, each for the sum of $U>o\uu\
to the evidence in this cast*, which we have
payable to Charles A. Haymoud, treasurer of
fully and carefully examined, w e have no
l the proposed company. These notes were,
hesitancy In saying that It is amply sufficient
j after maturity, assigned to plaintiff, who Into support the findings and judgment of the
j stltuted this suit to recover judgment on
trial court.
Not only this, but the proof
I them. The answer admitted the execution
failed to sustain the allegations of plaintliT,
of the notes, aud alleged the consideration to
ami any other tindlug and Judgment would
have been the promise aud ngreemeul that
have been against the great weight and prethe railway company would build, construct,
ponderance of the evidence. The testimony
and operate a street-railway line from the
cannot be read without creating the convicprincipal business portion of the city of Den*
tion that no marriage w a s ever contemplatver to Monteluir, along and upon Eighth aveed, and that the relations between the parnue; that it would run and operate luisseiuu-r
tics were wholly meretricious.
If the facts
cars, p r o f i l e d by electricity, upon and along
presented a case in which there w a s the
suid railway line, and would carry therein passlightest reason to believe that youth and insengers to and fro for reasonable hire; that
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Certified Public Accountants
466 East 5th South • Suite 200 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / (801) 521-7620

Associates

Joel E. Colley & Robin L. Hough
Salt Lake City, Utah

The accompanying statements of assets and liabilities of Joel E. Colley
& Robin L. Hough as of December 31, 1980, have been compiled by us,
A compilation is limited to presenting in the form of financial statements information that is the representation of owners. We have not
audited or reviewed the accompanying statements of assets and liabilities
and, accordingly, do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance on them.

9Ca^t^Ly 7 ^ W 2 w ^ -V

fljj&vio^

Karren, Hendrix & Associates
May 1, 1981
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JOEL E. COLLEY & ROBIN L. HOUGH
STATEMENT OF ASSETS & LIABILITIES
DECEMBER 31, 1980

COST
BASIS

ESTIMATED
VALUE
BASIS

/*»£</

ASSETS
Cash
Jewelry & precious metals
Home furnishings
Automobile
Boat
Trailer
Corporate stock (see footnote \\1)
Partnership interests (see footnote #3)
Real estate - personal residence
Real estate - other (see footnote #4)

30,000
12,500
55,000
10,500
14,350
3,000
13,000
126,250
125,000
420,000

}

/rrts
30,000
20,000 PtU.a-.*;
50,000
,or<xrj
7,000
-a
13,000
HZO^
2,000 P^Cno k*1

101,870
£o,ovt
4f57000<?v>~i7J
-200,4)00 itqetrO
603,000 ptg.firm

809,600

1.199,870

^Qr^

200
17,400
19,730

200
17,400
519,730

zm*n<

537,330

537,330

32^?

LIABILITIES
Miscellaneous personal liabilities
Loans payable (see footnote #5)
Mortgages payable (see footnote #6)

$

EXCESS OF ASSETS OVER LIABILITIES

A-9

See accountants' compilation report attached.

272^2211

$

/ oro
1 -?CrtJ

662.540 <%/>/£

^JOEL E. COLLEY & ROBIN L. HOUGH"
NOTES TO STATEMENT OF ASSETS & LIABILITIES
DECEMBER 31, 1980
1.

ESTIMATED VALUES

All estimated values were determined by Joel E. Colley and Robin L. Hough.
2.

CORPORATE STOCK

Corporate stock includes 100% of the stock of Joel E. Colley, M.D., A
Professional Corporation. Cost of the stock was $1,000.00. The current
net worth of the corporation is $86,870. Other stock holdings are
common stocks in various corporations with a cost of approximately $12,000
and an estimated value of $15,000.
3.

PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
COST BASIS

PARTNERSHIP
Can-Am Drilling ...
/ bokttJ^J
Arlington Park Associates
Bend Arch 80-A
Integrated Cattle Systems I
McCormick Oil & Gas Co.
Apache Oil & Gas <i>-t»£>»*-«
Shasta Mining
fcrtrrf

4.

f V»»> s uoi ft^Wt-t.

ESTIMATED
CURRENT VALUE

$ 15,000 .
57,500
15,000
5,000
12,500
6,250
15,000

$

$126,250

siLLm

f<V2*/
<?3:

5,000
58,000
60,000

^•a^sY:
3i5T
C02
?&3

5,000
12,000
3,000
30,000

(1)

- O-

£>»*«., eA.

<£>7 etre,
I

REAL ESTATE - OTHER
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

COST BASIS

ESTIMATED
CURRENT VALUES

,Z96

<f£2£P

Rental Properties (income producing)
1550 South 4th East, S.L.C., Utah
520 9th Ave. , S.L.C, Utah
514 Wilson, S.L.C, Utah
1358 Roberta, S.L.C, Utah
231 Browning Ave., S.L.C, Utah
382 Leslie, S.L.C, Utah
Hot Springs, Montana

51,305
42,110
39,405
36,643
43,145
43,609
12,153

$ 65,000
70,000
48,000
48,000
48,000
48,000
15,000

25,000
47,000

120,000
56,000
85,000

s-^c' "Wgxv.?,
d/7 firf- ***,
"7/gv h>Pr- 35,
SjzZL 0 / ^ \ : C' £
f/Sf *P/»«- ~&,i
<
i'vh^
-ti,°
-tec c*i.
2,6

Investment Properties
Flathead, Montana
Spring Creek, Park City, Utah
Duplex lot, Park City, Utah
TOTAL

$603.000
A-10
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JOEL E. COLLEY & ROBIN L. HOUGH
NOTES TO STATEMENT OF ASSETS & LIABILITIES
DECEMBER 31, 1980
PAGE 2

5.

LOANS PAYABLE

Loans are payable to various organizations and Individuals as follows:

SECURITY
Boat
Car
None
None
None

PAYMENT
MONTHLY
ANNUAL
$263

223
$1,768

667
38

INTEREST
RATE

BALANCE

11%
12%
4%
4%
3%

$-5T«00
-£T600

TOTAL
6.

MATURITY
DATE

DUE

1983
1983
1982
1983
1986

2^800
1-.500
1,700
$1.7^400

MORTGAGES PAYABLE

Mortgages are payable to various financial institutions, the Joel E. Colley,
M.D., P.C. Retirement Trust, and various individuals

SECURITY
Personal residence
Personal residence
1550 South 4th East
520 9th Ave.
514 Wilson
1358 Roberta
231 Browning
382 Leslie Ave.
Hot Springs
Flathead
Spring Creek'
Park. City

MONTHLY
PAYMENT

INTEREST
RATE

BALANCE

919

10 1/2%
10 1/2%

$ 91,000
15,000

272
413
324
348
320
329
383
-0720
420
-0-

10%
11%
10 1/2%
6 3/4%
10 1/2%
10 1/2%

9%
9%
13%
13%

Due Joel E. Colley M.D., P.C. Retirement
Trust, secured by 2nd mortgages on above
properties with interest payable annually
at 12% to 15%, and with the principal
balances payable in single balloon payments, the first of which being due in
February, 1981, and the last in December,
1984

DUE

2007
1988
42-jeeo—
*1984
31,900
2009
36,000
*1985
2006
33x990
2006
32,000
2008
40,000
^2^600 <-0-- 9/81
*1986
57,700
*1985
49,500 V
^TOOO
-&- 6/1/82
465,100

_5j4v630
$519.730

A-ll

MATURITY
DATE

f<i T,

-

£2^-liwSI
-4?•2,1, H3>(*
"Sav

•2M,

-£~
yro

39
-
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